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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three chapters. These chapters use the power of
the gravity model widely employed in the international economics literature. The
first chapter investigates how economic integration agreements impact countries’ lo-
cal technology, wages, prices and market access, and how to aggregate these effects to
compute the changes in countries’ welfare. By examining 16 countries that have har-
monized with the European Union since 1980, we show that almost all of the partici-
pating countries experience welfare gains as a result of signing integration agreements
with the European Union.
The objective of the second chapter is to explain the determinants of foreign
direct investment (FDI) flows; in particular, we focus on the effects of estimates
of economic integration agreements on FDI flows while controlling for time-varying
country specific unobserved variables as well as time constant country-pair unob-
served variables. As compared to the previous literature, we find that the coefficient
estimates of common market and custom union are overestimated and the free trade
agreement coefficient becomes insignificant after accounting for above-mentioned un-
observed variables.
Building on the work of Baier and Bergstrand (2009), the third chapter aims to
obtain unbiased, consistent and efficient coefficient estimates of trade cost variables
by accounting for unobserved country heterogeneity and approximation errors.
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Chapter 1
Do Economic Integration Agreements Increase
Countries’ International Trade, Welfare and Tech-
nology?
1.1 Introduction
Over the last two decades, the world has seen a tremendous increase in the
number of economic integration agreements (EIAs). The World Trade Organization
reports that the number of trade agreements in force increased from 14 as of 1980 to
379 as of June 20141. These agreements cover different levels of economic integration.
Following Baier et al. (2014), we classify these EIAs by depth of the agreements; in
particular, the EIAs are classified as free trade agreements (FTAs), custom unions
(CUs), common markets (CMs), and economic unions (EUs). A simple question
this paper proposes to answer is “Why are countries willing to sign EIAs?” One
common and obvious reason is that they increase bilateral (multilateral) trade flows
through the reduction in trade costs as EIAs can remove trade barriers and allow free
movement of goods and services across borders. It is not too surprising then that
the rise in trade agreements over this period has been coupled with an extraordinary
growth in international trade. According to the World Bank’s “World Development
Indicators” the world trade has increased by 845% while the world GDP has increased
1The data are available at www.wto.org.
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by 550% since 19802. Thus, the first objective of the current paper is to corroborate
the findings of the literature by showing that each type of agreement has statistically
and economically positive effect on bilateral trade flows.
The establishment of EIAs not only impacts bilateral trade flows between coun-
tries, they also bear other consequences as well. The ultimate objective of the trade
agreements is to increase the living standards of the participating countries. A rel-
evant and crucial question is “How and to what extent do increases in EIAs impact
welfare3?” This is the primary objective of this study. To provide an answer in de-
tail, we employ a structural gravity model where agents have Dixit-Stiglitz-Krugman
(DSK) preferences with constant elasticity of substitution (CES); the marginal cost
of production is constant, but firms have a fixed entry cost; we assume, as is standard
in these models, the market structure is monopolistically competitive. The exercise is
similar in spirit to Arkolakis et al. (2012), who decompose the welfare gains to simple
sufficient statistics such that the welfare gains related to the share of expenditure on
local products scaled by the elasticity of substitution. In this paper, we decompose
these welfare gains into wage effect, technology effect and price effects.
In addition, we also build on the works of Fujita et al. (2001), and Redding
and Venables (2004), who use a wage equation and empirically measure the effect
of geography and technology on wages. In the framework of Redding and Venables,
technology explains much less of variations in wages than in this study because our
model explicitly accounts for technology for wages whereas their model links wages to
geography, and technology assumed the same across countries is responsible for the
rest. As in Redding and Venables, the wage equation is derived from the structural
gravity equation, and this enables us to simultaneously track the effects of technology
2The data are available up to 2013 at http://data.worldbank.org
3Welfare is given by wages deflated by prices.
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and market access on wages because the structural gravity equation can, in theory,
identify changes in wages that are caused by EIAs’ impact on market access as well
as to identify correlations between entering into EIAs and productivity. For the em-
pirical analysis, the identifications of market access and price index in this paper are
similar to the outward multilateral resistance terms (OMRs) and inward multilateral
resistance terms (IMRs) presented by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003).
As in most trade models with DSK preferences, welfare depends on the wage rate
and price index, and the wage rate is a function of the OMR and “local” technology.
In standard trade models, technology may be impacted by several reasons:
i) Free trade enables countries to specialize in the production of some goods
through comparative advantage technology. In monopolistically competitive
environments, trade allows for gains through economies of scale.
ii) An increase (decrease) in the production of traded goods stimulates (lessens)
either the number of varieties or the volume of existing goods produced in a partner
country. Either way, the increase (decrease) in the production supply generates a
higher (lower) demand for workers available in the country. Under the condition of
increasing return to scale technology, on the avereage, workers become more
(less) productive and total productivity of that country will go up (down).
iii) As the level of openness increases the competition among firms in a
market goes up, leading the least productive firms to exit the market. In this paper;
on the contrary, the least productive firms do not exit since all firms within a country
have identical technology. In addition, the CES structure implies the same mark-up
so that no firm is squeezed out of the market.
iv) As the volume of bilateral trade increases between members, trade-related
3
technology diffusion between the members increases.
v) Increases in capital accumulation as a result of EIAs can contribute to
technology of participating countries.
We then list two arguments on how prices can be affected: i) the reduction in
trade costs due to free trade can decrease prices in a country, ii) a positive (negative)
change in the country’s technology diminishes (raise) price index as more (less) goods
and varieties become available at lower (higher) production costs.
In this paper; however, we do not model these mechanism explicitly; instead, the
wage equation in conjunction with the structural gravity model enable us to measure
countries’ technology. Technology in this model is similar to the Solow residual from
the growth literature. Technology is the amount of average wages that cannot be
explained once we take into account the other factors that influence bilateral trade.
In order to decompose the wage equation into the contributions of technology and
market access, we need to first estimate the coefficients on the trade cost variables.
Then, the OMRs and the IMRs are calculated from the structural gravity equation
using the coefficient estimates of the trade cost variables. The wage equation is
applied to back out technology for each of the 182 countries for each year from 1970-
2009 given the OMRs and per capita GDPs as proxy for wages. Finally, given IMR,
OMR and technology, we can measure each country’s welfare.
By utilizing the above-mentioned computation, the main objective of this paper
is to investigate whether welfare and technology grow faster after a country becomes
part of an EIA. In particular, this study focuses narrowly on the 5-year and 10-
year average changes in welfare and technology (as well as wages, prices and market
access) of 16 member countries before and after they joined the European Union
4
(EEU)4. We take the years of EEU entry as baselines for comparison analysis for
6 countries (Austria, Finland, Greece, Portugal, Spain and Sweden) as there was
no prior agreement between the EEU and the six members5. Rather than the year
of entry, we base on the years of signing of Association Agreements for 10 Central
and Eastern European Countries (CEEC)6 because Association Agreements aim to
provide trade liberalization, prepare countries for future membership of the EEU, and
establish close economic and political cooperation according to the EEU External
Action Service7. In addition, Caporale et al. (2009) argue that the fundemental goal
of the establisment of the EEU is not only to increase the market openness and welfare
but also to present peace, stability and democracy to all joining countries for which
the first step is to sign Association Agreements. Egger and Larch (2011) also consider
Association Agreements to find an answer for how trade liberalization impacts trade,
GDPs and welfare in both the EEU and the CEEC. These authors find Association
Agreements to have positive effects on CEEC’s trade, GDPs and welfare while using
different methodology than this paper8.
For impatient readers, we find that technology and welfare of fifteen in sixteen
countries increase by more 10 years after the harmonisation as compared to 10 years
before. In addition, all countries but Slovenia experience higher welfare and tech-
nology growth comparing 5 years before and after they integrated with the EEU. To
4The number of country used in this study is restricted by the data availability. Please see table
1.2.
5Note that the EEU signed trade agreements with Austria, Finland, Portugal and Sweden in
1973, but those FTAs did not allow for real harmonisation among the EEU and the countries, and
thus were not much effective on the countries’ economy.
6The EEU signed Association Agreements with Hungary and Poland in 1994, Bulgaria, Czech
Republic, Romania and Slovakia in 1995, Estonia, Latvia and Lithunia in 1998, and Slovenia in
1999.
7For more information, please refer to http://eeas.europa.eu/association
8Egger and Larch (2011) neither employ a wage equation nor account for technology and its
impact on welfare.
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assess the robustness of the comparison results, we investigate how the participating
countries perform relative to the rest of the world and relative to the incumbent EEU
countries. Results are consistent and robust.
We organize the rest of this paper as follow. The next section summarizes a
literature review, third section explains the derivations of the wage equation and
structural gravity model, forth section describes the data, fifth section presents the
estimation process of the gravity equation with fixed effect approach, sixth section
shows how to measure welfare, technology, wages, prices and market access, seventh
section reveals the coefficient estimates of trade cost variables and the comparison
results of welfare, technology, wages, prices and market access. The last section is
the conclusion.
1.2 Literature Review
The gravity equation is perhaps one of the most frequently used models in em-
pirical international trade. This empirical approach has been widely used to explain
the bilateral trade flows. Since the first study by Tinbergen (1962), the link be-
tween the empirical regularities of the gravity equation and theoritical models based
on principles of microeconomics have provided more guidance in terms of empirical
specifications and policy guidance.
A number of studies have attempted to evaluate the impacts of EIAs on bilat-
eral trade flows. For example, Aitken (1973), Abrams (1980), and Brada and Mendez
(1985) found that the European Economic Union (EEU) had a statistically significant
effect on bilateral trades among members. Baier and Bergstrand (2007) find that the
partial equilibrium impact of a trade agreement implies trade nearly doubles after
10 years. Baier et al. (2008) posed that the EEU had a large effect on bilateral
6
trade flows over the period of 1960 through 2000, and recent EIAs have economically
and statistically important impacts on members’ trade employing the structural grav-
ity equation. Vicard (2009) argued that establisment of regional trade agreements
(RTAs) increased the bilateral trade flows of member countries. Roy (2010) found
that CUs had larger effect than FTAs on bilateral trade. Baier et al. (2014) found
deeper EIAs to have positively and significantly larger effect on the volume of bilateral
trade among members. While most recent studies have found that these agreements
increase trade, Bergstrand (1985) and Frankel et al. (1995) did not find a significant
effect. These papers may suffer from the omitted variable bias discussed in Baier and
Bergstrand (2007).
There are several studies that have provided insights linking the change in applied
trade structure between countries to the change in their productivity. For instance,
Choudhri and Hakura (2000) showed that the increase in trade openness promoted
the level of productivity in the developing countries through competition among firms
in the medium-growth manufacturing sector. Schiff and Wang (2004) found that
technology diffusion from NAFTA and the EEU had a significant effect on technolgy
growth in Mexico and Poland, respectively. Cardarelli and Kose (2004) found that
the creations of NAFTA and CUSFTA decreased trade costs and increased not only
the trade flows but also technology of the member countries. Bernard et al. (2006)
showed that the reduction in trade costs increased productivity using a dataset that
traced average tariff and transportation costs across U.S. manufacturing industries
through 1977-2001. Miroudot et al. (2012) argued that the decrease in trade costs
led higher productivity in service sectors and found that a 10% reduction in trade
costs promoted productivity nearly 0.5%. A recent study of Alvarez et al. (2013)
found that freer trade persistently and positively impacts productivity considering
7
the effects of flow of ideas and diffusion.
An important implication of market access associated with our study is that
it is we relate the changes in trade costs to wages. Overman et al. (2003) showed
that the higher level of market access led to higher wages. In addition, Redding and
Venables (2004) found that approximately 70% of the variation in wages was caused
by the geographical effects; market access and supplier access. Boulhol et al. (2008)
found that the lower market access relative to the OECD average caused a reduction
in wages around by ten percent in Australia and New Zealand, whereas relatively
higher market access positively contributed to wages around 7% in Belgium and the
Netherlands. Waugh (2010) noted that there would be a reduction in wage differences
among countries if poor countries had the same market access to wealthier markets.
There are a few studies that cover wages, productivity and trade policy. Melitz
(2003) argues that a trade agreement may result in a shift in employment to more
productive firms and increasing wage rates where he assumed one factor(labor), one
industry and monopolostic competition. Behrens et al. (2012) show that productivity
and wages respond to change in trade costs using Canada-US interregional data.
1.3 Theoritical Background and Gravity Equation
In this paper, the structural gravity equation is derived from a model where
agents have Dixit-Stiglitz-Krugman preferences with constant elasticity of substitu-
tion (CES), the marginal cost of production is constant but firms have a fixed entry
cost, and market structure is assumed to be monopolistically competitive.
1.3.1 Consumer Behaviour
It is assumed that there exists a fixed number of consumers in each country j
8
and the consumers can purchase up to Ni categories of goods from country i. Then,












where C denotes the set of countries and cij(z) is the consumption of good z produced
in i and shipped to j. In order to make the model tractable, we make the simplifying
assumptions that all firms within a country have access to the same technology;
however, technology may vary across countries. This assumption implies that all
goods exported by firms in country i sell for the same price in country j. In other
words, pij(z) = pij for all goods produced in i and shipped to j. Under this scenario,
each consumer in country j consumes the same amount of each variety produced in
country i with Ni varieties of goods. In this model, σ is the elasticity of substitution
between goods also represents the elasticity of demand when the variety of products











where C is the set of countries that j imports from, and cij represents the consumption
of any good exported from country i to country j. Ni is also the number of firms as
each firm produces a single variety of goods due to monopolistic competition. The
representetive individual in country j maximizes the utility function in equation 1




where income and total expenditure of the agent in country j are denoted by the
term Wj (assuming trade is balanced), and pij stands for the price of any variety
in country j shipped from country i and includes any additional cost. The price of
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a good, therefore, is measured on a c.i.f (cost, insurance, freight) basis whereas, pi
denotes the price of any variety in a domestic market and is on a f.o.b. (free on
board) basis. We assume that goods shipped from i to j are subject to ”iceberg”
transportation cost (Tij) as in Samuelson (1952). This implies that Tij amount of
goods have to be sent in order for one unit to arrive to the final destination where Tij
≥ 1.
The first-order conditions from the household’s problem imply the demand for
a variety of good as cij = (pij/Pj)









We assume that total shipments from i, inclusive of iceberg trade costs, to all
other market is equal to total production; that is: qi =
∑C
j= cijTij. The total value
of the products shipped from origin i to destination j is:
Xij = Nicijpij (2)
By using the equation of the demand for a good from the consumer behaviour








The market structure is assumed to be monopolistically competitive. This im-
10
plies that each firm in country i produces and exports a single variety of goods under
the condition of increasing return to scale technology. It is also assumed that labor
is the only factor in the production process. Within a country all firms have access
to the same technology, so that the production technology of a good z in country i
is given by: qi(z) = Aili(z)− fi, where qi(z) is the quantity of a variety z produced
and li(z) is the number of workers employed by the representative firm in country
i. Ai and fi denote the marginal productivity of a labor and the fixed cost in the
production process, common to all firms in i. Total profits of the representetive firm
are:






After the distribution condition from the goods market section is inserted into






- (Wifi). The demand
of good z by individuals in j is substituted into the latter profit function, the first-order
conditions for the profit maximization imply that price is a markup over the firm’s














. In this framework, the price
that the firm charges is decreasing in σ. The markup is independent of its production
and the production of other firms. Monopolistic competition implies that firms will
make zero economic profit because there is free entry and exit in the long run. This
condition determine the amount of goods produced by a firm as qi(z) = Aifi(σ − ).
1.3.4 Labor Market
In this model, the labor market also clears in the equilibrium. By substituting
















. The number of firms located and the varieties of goods produced in country
i increase as the amount of labor force increases, and the elasticity of substitution
and the fixed cost decrease.
1.3.5 Multilateral Resistance Terms and Wage Equation
The ideal price index of country j from the consumer’s behaviour section can be






. After the number of firms and the mill price









where Å = Ai
(fi)
/σ , γ(σ) = σ
−(σ − )
σ−


























The expression in parentheses is a GDP-weighted measure of trade cost resistance
imposed by firms in country i when they export their products to country j and is
quite similar to the GDP share weighted OMRs used by Anderson and van Wincoop










Using the OMRs, the number of firms from the labor market section and equation







Equation 6 implies that wage in country i is affected by the change in technology
of other countries and the change in market access that follows from any variation in

















1.3.6 Identification of the Structural Gravity Equation
















The parameter Tij is a proxy for iceberg trade costs when country i faced ex-
porting the products. It is comprised of distance and the dummy variables common
language, common border, common colonizer, FTA, CU, CM and EU . All of the
variables are further explored in the subsequent section.
1.4 Data Description
The data on GDP and population for 182 countries over the period of 1970-
2009 are drawn from the World Bank’s “World Development Indicators”9. The data
9A complete list of countries is shown in table 1.1.
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on bilateral trade flows for each pair come from “United Nations Commodity Trade





The variables distance and common colonizer are drawn from “Centre d’Etudes
Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales” (CEPII) 11. We use the distance mea-
sure associated with distance in kilometers between the most populous city in coun-
tries. A number of articles have indicated that the amount of trade flows are nega-
tively correlated with distance and the coefficient on distance is close to negative one
(Tinbergen, 1962; Feenstra et al., 2001; Eaton and Kortum. 2002; Anderson and van
Wincoop, 2003; Henderson and Millimet, 2008; Bergstrand et al., 2013). The trade
cost among countries increases with dij because transportation costs and searching
costs go up as well.
The variable colonial relationship, colij, is equal to one if two countries have ever
shared a common colonizer and zero otherwise. One example of this case is Caribbean,
Cameroon, Vietnam, and Tunisia were colonized by France. A colonial relationship
refer to a historical tie between countries that can increase the amount of trade
between them. Emprical studies of Rose and van Wincoop (2001), Estevadeordal et.
al (2003), and Felbermayr and Kohler (2006) found a statistically significant positive
impact of colonial relationship on bilateral trade.
The variables common language and common border are obtained from Head et
al. (2010). The common language parameter,langij, is equal to unity when countries
have the same official language and 0 otherwise. This variable is used to understand
10The data are available at www.unctad.org
11French research center that produces studies, databases, and analyses on the world economy.
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the influence that language has on direct comminication and translation between
trading partners. Wei (1996), and Eaton and Kortum (2002) empirically showed that
common language had statistically significant and positive effect on bilateral trade
flow. The reduction in the amount of trade due to the usage of different language
is likely caused by increases in trade cost such as the need to employ a translater.
In addition to this example, Helliwell (1997) noted “A common language provides
evidence of common cultural roots, shared literature and lore, and even shared codes
of law. Where there is a common language there is also likely to be greater sharing of
literature, radio and television communications, and even educational exchanges, and
with all of these come greater knowledge of institutions, networks and individuals of
a sort likely to forge tighter economic ties”.
A pair of countries which share a common border (adjacency) are expected to
have cultural and economic similarities that encourage trade between them. The
variable for the adjacency effect, bordij, is equal to 1 when countries are adjacent and
0 otherwise, and captures the effect of geography on trade costs that is not caught by
the distance parameter. Being contiguous provides more choices when sending goods
across national borders. Redding and Venables (2004), and Bussiere and Schnatz
(2009) showed that sharing the same national border promoted the bilateral trade
flows between countries. Since crossing borders mostly entails additional fees and
transactions costs, exporters will be subject to higher trade costs if countries are not
adjacent because they have to across over more than one border.
A free trade area is a trade bloc for which countries sign a free trade agreement
that removes tariffs and quatos between all involved countries. The variable free trade
agreement, FTAij, is equal to 1 when countries have a signed free trade aggrement and
0 otherwise. A custom Union (CU) goes further than FTA because a CU requires
15
its partners to impose a set of common tariffs against non-member countries. An
example of CU is the extablished custom union between the EEU and Turkey in
1996. CUij is equal to 1 when countries have a custom union, and zero otherwise.
A common market (CM) is comprised of a free trade area that includes regulations
such as removing the impediments to the free movement of capital, labor, and other
services. The binary variable CMij is equal to one if countries have a common market
and 0 otherwise. The deepest integration is an economic union (EU) which basically
consists of a common market and a custom union. Members agree upon regulations
regarding the free movement of factors of production and services, and the rule of
common external trade. Participants mostly accept using the same currency. EUij is
equal to unity for countries have entered into an economic union and zero otherwise.
The EEU is a good example of transition from a basic integration to a higher level
of integration. The EEU was first founded as a custum union in 1952, converted to a
common market in 1994, and was finally coverted into an economic union in 1999.
The data for free trade agreements, custom unions, common markets, and eco-
nomic unions from 1970-2005 are obtained from Jeffrey Bergstrand’s website12 and
from 2006-2009 are drawn from the WTO database. The effects of EIAs are widely
covered in the literature section.
1.5 Estimation of the Structural Gravity Equation
Estimating the structural gravity specifacition is straightforward. A more con-
venient way to write the empirical equation 8 is in log-form:
log(Xij) = β1log(Yi)+β2log(Yj)−(1−σ)log(Πi)−(1−σ)log(Pj)+(1−σ)log(Tij) (9)
12The data are available at www.nd.edu/jbergstr/ and constructed under National Science Foun-
dation grants SES-0351018 and SES-0351154, and used by many studies including Baier and
Bergstrand (2007), Baier et al. (2008) and Baier et al. (2014).
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where Tij can be rewritten as:
log(Tij) = αlog(dij) + αlangij + αbordij + αcolij + αFTAij + αCUij
+α7CMij + α8EUij + eij
The bilateral trade costs (Tij) for each pair for each year can be estimated using
the data on the trade variables13. Then, OMRs and IMRs for each country for each
year can be computed using equation 9 given the coefficient estimates of bilateral
trade costs, value of σ, GDPs and bilateral trade flows.
1.5.1 Endogeneity Problem and Fixed Effect Approach
Lawrence (1998) commented that “The issue of exogeneity may also be an impor-
tant problem when dummy variables are used (in the gravity specification) to estimate
the effects of free trade areas. Free trade areas may well be an endogenous variable-
that is, a response to, rather than a source of, large trade flows.” In addition, Trefler
(1993), and Lee and Swagel (1997) demonstrated that existence or absence of EIAs
was not exogenous and estimation effects were underestimated due to endogeneity
bias. A recent study by Baier and Bergstrand (2007) showed that estimation results
of EIAs suffered from endogeneity bias, perhaps because of self selection of country
pairs’ governments into trade agreements and related to the amount of bilateral trade
flows. Baier and Bergstrand (2007) also mentioned that the decisions of countries
on joining EIAs were slow-moving; however, trade flows were not slow-moving. The
presence of slow-moving problem implies that observed variables in trade costs are
likely to be highly correlated with unobservable variables concealed in the error term
eij.
Given the consensus over the potential of endogeneity of EIAs, Baier and Bergstrand
13Please see section 5.1. for more information on how to estimate the model.
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(2007) suggested that applying panel data techniques employing country-pair fixed
effect, importer-year and exporter-year fixed effects should get over endogeneity bias
of EIAs14. Anderson and Yotov (2012) supported the results of Baier and Bergstrand
(2007) using panel techniques, too. In addition, Anderson and van Wincoop (2003)
suggested to account for fixed effects in the gravity equation to obtain unbiased mul-
tilateral resistance terms.
Following Baier and Bergstrand (2007), the below fixed effect model is used to
obtain unbiased estimates of EIAs:
lnXijt = β0 + β1FTAijt + β2CUijt + β3CMijt + β4EUijt + κij + ξit + ζit + εijt (10)
where κij is a country-pair fixed effect to capture possible time-invariant unobserv-
able variables impacting bilateral trade flows. The parameters ξit and ζit represent
exporter-year and importer-year fixed effects to capture time-varying GDP as well as
possible unobservable time-variant country specific variables for each pair of country i
and j impacting the amount of bilateral trade. The parameters ξit and ζit also contain
the exporters and importers multilateral resistance terms referring to Anderson and
van Wincoop (2003).
Note that we only estimate the coefficients on the“time-varying” variables FTA,
CU, CM, EU using equation 10 to avoid unnecessary complexity. Because the bilateral
fixed effects subsume all “time-invariant” variables (distance, language, adjacency
and colonial relationship), they are chosen among coefficient estimates in the existing
literature. Besides, more explanation about the value of coefficients on these variables
are given in later sections. Notice that there will be some change (reduction) in
14Baier and Bergstrand (2007) also indicated that employing only country pair fixed effect did not
provide an unbiased estimation if governments select into EIAs.
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bilateral trade costs only if the time-variant variables take different values such as
when a country partakes in any of the following actions: i) Sign a free trade agreement,
ii) Join a custom union, iii) Join in a common market, iv) Enter into an economic
union.
1.6 Measuring Technology
Along with the estimated OMRs, we need to back out country specific technology.
We do so in three steps. The first step is to write the productivity of country i relative












note that γ(σ) is cancelled out because it is constant across countries for each year.
After presenting a convenient normalization for the relationship between the world in-











where Åus,t can be taken out of the summation since it is independent of i. Given
wages, labor endowment, σ and estimated OMRs, we can first compute each country’s
relative technology and then measure technology of the US using equation 11. Last,
once Åus,t is known, technology of country i at time t is equal to the product of Åus,t
and ai,us,t.
Note that when a country’s technology is unusually high or low at any year,
a comparison result might give a misleading answer. This type of issue arises for
welfare, price index, wage and market access as well. To address this issue, we use
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5-year and 10-year average growth rates for the variables of interest for comparison
analyses.
1.6.1 Measuring the Average Growth Rates
Two distinguished measures are applied to make the comparison results robust.
They are absolute measure and difference in difference measure. Each is further
explored in the next sections.
1.6.1.1 Absolute Measure
In this section, we formulate absolute measures of average welfare gain, average
technology growth, average wage growth and average changes in prices and market





where log(Åi,t) and log(Åi,0) are the natural logarithmic values of country i’s tech-
nology at time t and zero, respectively.
For example, country i’s 5-year average technology growth rate before and after







where 5b and 5a denote 5-year before and 5-year after periods.
In this paper, welfare of an agent at time t is computed as wage divided by price
index at time t, welfarei,t = Wi,t/Pi,t. A change in welfare can be pinned down as the
change in real incomes between two periods, or equivalently, the difference between
t-year average wage growth rate (ωi,t) and t-year average change in prices (Φi,t) is










Regarding the same country i, the average welfare gain for ten-year after is:
$i,10a = ωi,10a − Φi,10a
where country i’s 10-year after average wage growth rate is ωi,10a =
log(Wi,2005)−log(Wi,1995)
10




Using the wage equation, market access of country i at time t is defined as wage





In connection with the above equation, t-year average change in market access
of country i (πi,t) is equal to the difference between t-year average wage growth rate















As an example, country i’s average market access rate for 5-year before is com-
puted by subtracting 5-year average technology growth rate from 5-year average wage
growth rate:
πi,5b = ωi,5b − gi,5b
1.6.1.2 Difference in Difference Measure
The second method is the difference in difference measure to compare a country’s
five-year and ten-year average rates before and after it joins the EEU. Two different
approaches are applied under this method. One is to investigate 16 countries’ per-
formances relative to the world. In detail, we initially calculate population weights
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of each country15, excluding the incumbent EEU members as of time t, wej,t =
Lj,t∑
j=1 Lj,t
, and then we measure the world’s average technology growth, gworld,t =∑
j=1(wej,t) ∗ (gj,t); the world’s average welfare gain, $world,t =
∑
j=1(wej,t) ∗ ($j,t);
the world’s average change in prices, Φworld,t =
∑
j=1(wej,t) ∗ (Φj,t); the world’s av-
erage wage growth, ωworld,t =
∑
j=1(wej,t) ∗ (ωj,t); the world’s average market access
growth, πworld,t =
∑
j=1(wej,t) ∗ (πj,t). Given the calculation of absolute measures,
we compute how a country performs against the world over t years as (gi,t − gworld,t),
($i,t −$world,t), (Φi,t − Φworld,t), (ωi,t − ωworld,t) and (πi,t − πworld,t).
The following example is provided to enlighten the analysis. Considering the
same country i once again, population weights of each country16 is given by wej,1995 =
Lj,1995∑
j=1 Lj,1995
. Thereafter, 5-year before average technology growth of the world is equal
to gworld,5b =
∑
j=1(wej,1995) ∗ (gj,5b). Given gi,5b, country i’s performance relative
to the world is presented by gi,b − gworld,b. In addition, using the same popula-
tion weights, 5-year after average technology growth of the world is expressed as
gworld,5a =
∑
j=1(wej,1995) ∗ (gj,5a). Given i’s average technology growth rate for five-
year after, difference in difference of country i against the world is gi,a − gworld,a.
After comparing (gi,a − gworld,a) to (gi,b − gworld,b), i’s technology increases by more
than the world after joining the EEU if the former is greater than the latter.
The second approach of the difference in difference mesaure is to comparing 16
countries’ performances against the incumbent members. Regarding the case of coun-




Furthermore, 10-year before average welfare gain is represented by$eeu,10b =
∑
i=1(wei,1995)∗
($i,10b). In a similar way, 10-year after average welfare gain is expressed as $eeu,10a =
15We also report the results based on GDP weights of each country in the Appendix.
16Considering the year 1995, the existing EEU countries Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Germany, the UK, Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Spain are not included.
22
∑
i=1(wei,1995)∗($i,10a). Utilizing the results from the absolute measure, i’s difference
in difference measure of average welfare gain for 10-year after and 10-year before can
be written by ($i,10a −$eeu,10a) and ($i,10b −$eeu,10b), respectively. Note that if the
former is greater than the latter, country i’s welfare gain is larger than the existing
members following the harmonisation.
1.7 Empirical Results
In this section, we first present the results related to the structural gravity model,
and then indicate the results related to welfare, technology, prices, market access and
prices.
1.7.1 Trade Costs and Elasticity of Substitution
Related to the trade cost variables, we first report the results for the time-variant
variables. We use constrained OLS to estimate the coefficients on EIAs in the fixed
effect model (equation 10) with bilateral trade flows as an endogenous variable for
the period 1969-2006. The output from the regression is located in table 1.3, where
only variables of interest (FTA, CU, CM, and EU) are reported and the estimates of
the importer-year, exporter-year, and country-pair fixed effects are not provided for
brevity. The coefficients for free trade agreement, custom union, common market,
and economic union in bilateral trade are positive and statistically significant, which
corroborates the findings of the literature. These coefficients are 0.263, 0.416, 0.860,
and 0.716 for FTA, CU, CM and EU, respectively.
As stated in the estimation of the structural gravity equation section, we do not
estimate the effects of the time-invariant variables on bilateral trade flows because
the coefficients on the these variables have already been estimated by many empirical
papers in the literature. For the distance, we choose the elasticity of -1.00 among
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the most common values (α1 = −0.50,−1.00,−1.50 ). For the effect of common
language, we select a value of α2 = 0.29. The choice of a value for common land
border is α3 = 0.80, and the elasticity of common colonial relationship is chosen as
α4 = 0.12.
The variable that is not calculated by any equation, but must be known to pin
down the values of multilateral resistance terms in the gravity equation is the elasticity
of substitution(σ) across variety of products. For this parameter, our selection is σ = 6
amongst the values most commonly used in the literature (σ = 3, 6, 10). When σ = 6
the impact of geography on wages is on the average relative to the cases where σ = 3
(strong love of variety) and σ = 10 (weak love of variety). This selection is consistent
with that used by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), Redding and Venables (2004)
and Egger and Larch (2011).
1.7.2 Results for Absolute Measure
We first report the results for 5 years after the harmonisation as compared to 5
years before. Columns (1), (3) and (4) in table 1.4 show that fifteen out of sixteen
countries experience welfare gains ($i,5 = $i,5a−$i,5b), positive wage growth (ωi,5 =
ωi,5a − ωi,5b) and positive technology growth (gi,5 = gi,5a − gi,5b) comparing 5-year
after to before. Take Romania for example; average annual welfare gain ($rom,5) is
1.10%, average annual technology growth is 0.93% and average wages (ωrom,5) grow
by 1.02% annually.
We then investigate 10-year absolute measures of average welfare change ($i,10 =
$i,10a −$i,10b), average wage growth (ωi,10 = ωi,10a − ωi,10b) and average technology
growth (gi,10 = gi,10a−gi,10b). Colomns (1), (3) and (4) in table 1.5 show that welfare,
wages and technology of all countries, excluding Greece, increase by more 10 years
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after joining the EEU as compared to 10 years before. For the case of Estonia, average
annual welfare gain is 3.04%, average annual wage growth is 2.70% and average annual
technology growth is 2.31%.
Although market access and prices for 5-year and 10-year periods do not re-
spond to the harmonisation in the way we anticipate, most of the countries’ price
index decreases and market access increases comparing post-entry periods to pre-
entry periods. It should be noted that technology is dominant factor in wages and
technology is much more responsible of the variation in wages than market access.
The change in wages determines whether a member gains or losses. To analyze the
accuracy of this argument, we perform difference in difference measures of average
welfare gain, average technology growth, average wage growth and average changes
in prices and market access.
1.7.3 Robustness
In this section, we check the robustness of the comparison results found in the ab-
solute measure section by addressing how 16 participating countries perform relative
to the rest of the world and relative to the incumbent EEU members.
1.7.3.1 Relative to The World
Table 1.6 reports the results on how 16 countries perform relative to the world
(not including the existing EEU countries) by 5 years after the integration with the
EEU against 5 years before. Columns (1) represents that only Slovenia experinces
average annual welfare loss ($i, −$world,) by -1.57%. Referring to columns (3)
and (4) in table 1.6, all countries but Slovenia show increases in average annual
wage growth against the world (ωi,t − ωworld,t) and average annual technology growth
against the world (gi,t − gworld,t) comparing 5-year after to before. For the case of Hun-
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gary, ($hun, −$world,), (ωhun, − ωworld,) and (ghun,5 − gworld,5) are 2.41%, 2.45%
and 2.44%, respectively.
Comparing 10 years after the harmonisation to 10 years before , columns (1)
and (3) in table 1.7 present that all countries except Austria and Greece experi-
ence average annual welfare gains ($i,t −$world,t) and average annual wage growth
(ωi, − ωworld,) relative to the world. In addition, column (4) indicates that only
Austria’s technology against the world (gi,10 − gworld,10) decreases by more 10 years
after the signing of the agreement as compared to 10 years before. Take Hungary for
example; ($hun, −$world,), (ωhun, − ωworld,) and (ghun,10 − gworld,10) are 1.36%,
1.29% and 1.21%, relatively. Notice that average annual welfare gains for Latvia and
Lithunia are 4.78% and 3.96%, implying they are among the participating countries
taking the advantage of the EEU at most.
As in the absolute measure section, most countries’ market access (prices) in-
creases (decreases) 10 years after the signing of the agreements as compared to 10
years before; however, (Φi, − Φworld,) does not fall and (πi, − πworld,) does not in-
crease for several countries referring to columns (2) and (5) in table 1.6. Since there
are also many other economic integration agreements take places between countries
in the world, these results are somewhat expected.
We close this section by noting that the comparison results in this section are
virtually identical to those in the absolute measure section. They are thus robust and
consistent.
1.7.3.2 Relative to the Incumbent EEU Members
Table 1.8 reports the results on how 16 countries perform relative to the exist-
ing EEU countries by 5 years after the signing of the agreements as compared to
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5 years before. Column (1) indicates that the same 15 countries as in the absolute
measure section experience average annual welfare gains relative to the incumbent
EEU countries, whereas two countries (Bulgaria and Slovenia) show decreases in av-
erage annual wage growth and average annual technology of four countries (Austria,
Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia) decreases as distinct from the absulate measure
section.
We reports the results for the measures of difference in difference against the
incumbent EEU 10 years after joining the EEU as compared to 10 years before in
table 1.9. Columns (1), (3) and (4) show that ($i, −$eeu,), (ωi, − ωeeu,) and
(gi,10 − geeu,10) are greater than zero for all countries except Greece. These results ba-
sically imply that these 15 countries benefit from harmonisation in terms of welfare,
wages and technology. Also, the results are consistent with the EEU’s purpose of in-
creasing the living standards of potential candidate countries and help them gradually
reaching real convergence.
1.8 Conclusion
The minor purpose of this paper is to find whether different levels of economic
integration agreements (EIAs), namely free trade agreements (FTAs), custom unions
(CU), common markets (CMs) and economic unions (EUs) increases bilateral trade
flows. We find that each of them positively and significantly impacts international
trade among countries using fixed effect approach. The primary objective of the
paper is to address how and to what extent these EIAs affect countries’ welfare. By
noting that welfare is computed by wage is deflated by price index, we use a wage
equation to decompose the contributions of technology and market access into wages.
The outward multilateral resistance terms serve as a proxy for market access. The
inward multilateral resistance terms proxy for price index. These are estimated from
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the structural gravity model.
To understand the effects of EIAs on welfare and technology (as well as wage,
price index and market access), we focus norrowly on 5-year and 10-year average
changes in welfare and technology (as well as wages, prices and market access) of 16
countries before and after they integrate with the European Union. The comparison
results show that the signing of agreements mostly have positive impacts on welfare
and technology of these participating countries. To assess the robustness of compar-
ison results, several measures are used in the empirical analysis. These findings are
also robust and consistent.
Even though we are not able to identify the reasons behind the changes in welfare,
technology, wage, price index and market access as it will be beyond the scope of this
paper, further studies may be interested in investigating these effects separately. This
study can easily be reproduced when the new dataset on bilateral trade flows and the
trade cost variables become available.
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Tables
Table 1.1: Country List
Afghanistan Dominica Latvia So Tom and Principe
Albania Dominican Rep Lebanon Saint Kitts and Nevis
Algeria Ecuador Lesotho Saint Lucia
Angola Egypt Liberia Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
Antigua And Barbuda El Salvador Libya Samoa
Argentina Equatorial Guinea Lithuania Saudi Arabia
Armenia Eritrea Luxembourg Senegal
Australia Estonia Macao, China Seychelles
Austria Ethiopia Macedonia, Fyr Singapore
Azerbaijan Fiji Madagascar Slovak Republic
Bahamas Finland Malawi Slovenia
Bahrain France Malaysia Solomon Islands
Bangladesh Gabon Maldives South Africa
Barbados Gambia Mali Spain
Belarus Georgia Malta Sri Lanka
Belgium Germany Marshall Islands, Rep Sudan
Belize Ghana Mauritania Suriname
Benin Greece Mauritius Swaziland
Bermuda Grenada Mexico Sweden
Bhutan Guatemala Micronesia, Fed.Sts. Switzerland
Bolivia Guinea Moldova Syria
Bosnia and Herzegovina Guinea-Bissau Mongolia Taiwan
Botswana Guyana Morocco Tajikistan
Brazil Haiti Mozambique Tanzania
Brunei Darussalam Honduras Myanmar Thailand
Bulgaria Hong Kong Namibia Togo
Burkina Faso Hungary Nepal Tonga
Burundi Iceland Netherland Trinidad (Trinidad And Tobago)
Cambodia India New Caledonia Tunisia
Cameroon Indonesia New Zealand Turkey
Canada Iran Nicaragua Turkmenistan
Cape Verde Iraq Niger Uganda
Central African Republic Ireland Nigeria UK
Chad Israel Norway Ukraine
Chile Italy Oman United Arab Emirates
China Ivory Coast Pakistan Uruguay
Colombia Jamaica Panama USA
Comoros Japan Papua New Guinea Uzbekistan
Congo, DR Jordan Paraguay Vanuatu
Costa Rica Kazakhstan Peru Venezuela
Croatia Kenya Philippine Vietnam
Cuba Kiribati Poland Yemen
Cyprus Korea Portugal Zambia







































Note: * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001.
Numbers in parenthesis are standard errors.
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Table 1.4: Results for Absolute Measures of 5-year Period
Country Welfare Price Wage Technology Market
Austria 1.25 -0.34 0.92 0.62 0.30
Bulgaria 0.76 -0.06 0.70 0.63 0.07
Czech Republic 1.26 0.10 1.36 1.42 -0.06
Estonia 0.51 0.10 0.61 0.57 0.04
Finland 1.38 0.31 1.69 1.93 -0.24
Greece 0.07 0.08 0.15 0.30 -0.15
Hungary 2.47 -0.06 2.41 2.31 0.10
Latvia 0.31 0.09 0.40 0.36 0.04
Lithuania 1.20 0.16 1.36 1.39 -0.03
Poland 3.68 -0.40 3.28 3.24 0.04
Portugal 1.27 0.08 1.35 1.49 -0.14
Romania 1.10 -0.08 1.02 0.93 0.09
Slovakia 2.37 0.07 2.43 2.47 -0.04
Slovenia -0.95 0.32 -0.63 -0.37 -0.26
Spain 0.88 0.24 1.12 1.40 -0.28
Sweden 0.87 0.38 1.25 1.55 -0.30
Table 1.5: Results for Absolute Measures of 10-year Period
Country Welfare Price Wage Technology Market
Austria 0.18 -0.11 0.07 0.09 -0.02
Bulgaria 1.28 -0.04 1.24 1.16 0.08
Czech Republic 1.67 -0.30 1.37 1.08 0.29
Estonia 3.04 -0.34 2.70 2.31 0.39
Finland 0.68 0.20 0.88 0.99 -0.11
Greece -0.74 0.15 -0.59 -0.49 -0.10
Hungary 1.65 -0.03 1.62 1.51 0.11
Latvia 5.60 -0.35 5.25 4.85 0.40
Lithuania 4.78 -0.32 4.46 4.09 0.37
Poland 2.20 -0.26 1.94 1.88 0.06
Portugal 0.49 -0.14 0.35 0.31 0.04
Romania 2.10 -0.03 2.07 2.00 0.07
Slovakia 2.49 -0.29 2.20 1.92 0.28
Slovenia 0.68 -0.15 0.53 0.31 0.22
Spain 0.72 -0.02 0.69 0.75 -0.06
Sweden 0.54 0.24 0.78 0.90 -0.12
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Table 1.6: Results for Relative to the World of 5-year Period
Country Welfare Price Wage Technology Market
Austria 1.37 -0.29 1.08 0.84 0.24
Bulgaria 0.88 -0.01 0.87 0.85 0.01
Czech Republic 1.38 0.15 1.53 1.64 -0.12
Estonia 0.30 0.04 0.33 0.36 -0.02
Finland 1.50 0.36 1.86 2.15 -0.29
Greece 0.47 0.04 0.51 0.65 -0.14
Hungary 2.41 0.03 2.45 2.44 0.01
Latvia 0.10 0.03 0.12 0.15 -0.02
Lithuania 0.99 0.10 1.08 1.18 -0.09
Poland 3.62 -0.31 3.32 3.37 -0.05
Portugal 1.23 0.14 1.37 1.48 -0.11
Romania 1.22 -0.03 1.19 1.15 0.03
Slovakia 2.49 0.12 2.60 2.69 -0.10
Slovenia -1.57 0.36 -1.21 -0.91 -0.30
Spain 0.83 0.30 1.13 1.39 -0.26
Sweden 0.99 0.43 1.42 1.77 -0.35
Table 1.7: Results for Relative to the World of 10-year Period
Country Welfare Price Wage Technology Market
Austria -0.20 -0.10 -0.30 -0.22 -0.08
Bulgaria 0.90 -0.03 0.87 0.85 0.03
Czech Republic 1.29 -0.29 1.00 0.77 0.24
Estonia 2.22 -0.33 1.89 1.61 0.28
Finland 0.30 0.21 0.51 0.68 -0.17
Greece -0.13 0.10 -0.03 0.06 -0.09
Hungary 1.36 -0.07 1.29 1.21 0.08
Latvia 4.78 -0.34 4.44 4.15 0.29
Lithuania 3.96 -0.31 3.65 3.39 0.26
Poland 1.91 -0.30 1.61 1.58 0.03
Romania 1.72 -0.02 1.70 1.69 0.02
Portugal 0.45 -0.09 0.36 0.29 0.07
Slovakia 2.11 -0.28 1.83 1.61 0.23
Slovenia 0.42 -0.16 0.26 0.14 0.12
Spain 0.67 0.03 0.70 0.73 -0.03
Sweden 0.16 0.25 0.41 0.59 -0.18
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Table 1.8: Results for Relative to the EEU of 5-year Period
Country Welfare Price Wage Technology Market
Austria 0.76 -0.60 0.16 -0.33 0.49
Bulgaria 0.27 -0.32 -0.05 -0.32 0.26
Czech Republic 0.77 -0.16 0.61 0.47 0.13
Estonia 0.85 -0.09 0.75 0.66 0.09
Finland 0.89 0.05 0.94 0.98 0.04
Greece 0.05 0.20 0.25 0.41 -0.16
Hungary 0.24 1.76 2.00 1.70 0.30
Latvia 0.65 -0.10 0.54 0.45 0.09
Lithuania 1.54 -0.03 1.50 1.48 0.02
Poland 1.45 1.42 2.87 2.63 0.24
Portugal 0.65 0.16 0.81 0.93 -0.12
Romania 0.61 -0.34 0.27 -0.02 0.28
Slovakia 1.88 -0.20 1.68 1.52 0.15
Slovenia -0.77 0.36 -0.40 -0.10 -0.30
Spain 0.25 0.32 0.57 0.84 -0.27
Sweden 0.38 0.12 0.50 0.60 -0.10
Table 1.9: Results for Relative to the EEU of 10-year Period
Country Welfare Price Wage Technology Market
Austria 0.45 -0.29 0.16 0.08 0.08
Bulgaria 1.55 -0.22 1.33 1.15 0.18
Czech Republic 1.94 -0.48 1.46 1.07 0.39
Estonia 3.46 -0.57 2.89 2.41 0.48
Finland 0.95 0.02 0.97 0.98 -0.01
Greece -0.73 0.07 -0.66 -0.58 -0.08
Hungary 0.45 1.23 1.68 1.47 0.21
Latvia 6.02 -0.58 5.44 4.95 0.49
Lithuania 5.20 -0.55 4.65 4.19 0.46
Poland 1.00 1.00 2.00 1.84 0.16
Portugal 0.01 0.08 0.09 0.16 -0.07
Romania 2.37 -0.21 2.16 1.99 0.17
Slovakia 2.76 -0.47 2.29 1.91 0.38
Slovenia 1.23 -0.33 0.90 0.62 0.28
Spain 0.23 0.20 0.43 0.60 -0.17
Sweden 0.81 0.06 0.87 0.89 -0.02
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Appendix. Results Based on GDP Weights
Results for Relative to the World of 5-year Period
Country Welfare Price Wage Technology Market
Austria 0.94 -0.28 0.67 0.44 0.24
Bulgaria 0.45 0.00 0.45 0.45 0.01
Czech Rep. 0.95 0.16 1.11 1.24 -0.12
Estonia 0.85 -0.03 0.83 0.80 0.03
Finland 1.07 0.37 1.44 1.75 -0.30
Greece 0.43 0.06 0.49 0.67 -0.18
Hungary 2.17 0.08 2.25 2.24 0.02
Latvia 0.65 -0.04 0.62 0.59 0.03
Lithunia 1.54 0.03 1.58 1.62 -0.04
Poland 3.38 -0.26 3.12 3.17 -0.04
Portugal 1.42 0.15 1.57 1.70 -0.12
Romania 0.79 -0.02 0.77 0.75 0.03
Slovekia 2.06 0.13 2.18 2.29 -0.10
Slovenia -1.11 0.32 -0.79 -0.52 -0.27
Spain 1.03 0.31 1.34 1.61 -0.26
Sweden 0.56 0.44 1.00 1.37 -0.36
Results for Relative to the World of 10-year Period
Country Welfare Price Wage Technology Market
Austria 0.16 -0.14 0.03 0.09 -0.06
Bulgaria 1.26 -0.07 1.20 1.16 0.04
Czech Republic 1.65 -0.33 1.33 1.08 0.25
Estonia 3.00 -0.40 2.61 2.26 0.34
Finland 0.66 0.17 0.84 0.99 -0.15
Greece -0.15 0.05 -0.10 0.07 -0.17
Hungary 1.38 0.27 1.65 1.60 0.05
Latvia 5.56 -0.41 5.16 4.80 0.35
Lithuania 4.74 -0.38 4.37 4.04 0.32
Poland 1.93 0.04 1.97 1.97 0.00
Portugal 0.71 -0.07 0.63 0.56 0.07
Romania 2.08 -0.06 2.03 2.00 0.03
Slovakia 2.47 -0.32 2.16 1.92 0.24
Slovenia -0.77 0.25 -0.52 -0.22 -0.30
Spain 0.94 0.03 0.97 1.00 -0.03
Sweden 0.52 0.21 0.74 0.90 -0.16
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Results for Relative to the EEU of 5-year Period
Country Welfare Price Wage Technology Market
Austria 0.78 -0.60 0.19 -0.30 0.49
Bulgaria 0.29 -0.32 -0.03 -0.29 0.26
Czech Republic 0.79 -0.16 0.63 0.50 0.13
Estonia 0.88 -0.10 0.78 0.69 0.09
Finland 0.91 0.05 0.96 1.01 -0.05
Greece 0.03 0.30 0.33 0.50 -0.17
Hungary 0.26 1.78 2.04 1.74 0.20
Latvia 0.68 -0.11 0.57 0.48 0.09
Lithuania 1.57 -0.04 1.53 1.51 0.02
Poland 1.47 1.44 2.91 2.67 0.14
Portugal 0.60 0.15 0.75 1.22 -0.47
Romania 0.63 -0.34 0.29 0.01 0.28
Slovakia 1.90 -0.19 1.70 1.55 0.15
Slovenia -0.78 0.36 -0.42 -0.12 -0.30
Spain 0.21 0.31 0.52 1.13 -0.61
Sweden 0.40 0.12 0.52 0.63 -0.11
Results for Relative to the EEU of 10-year Period
Country Welfare Price Wage Technology Market
Austria 0.45 -0.31 0.13 0.05 0.08
Bulgaria 1.55 -0.24 1.30 1.12 0.18
Czech Republic 1.94 -0.50 1.43 1.04 0.39
Estonia 3.47 -0.57 2.89 2.41 0.48
Finland 0.95 0.00 0.94 0.95 -0.01
Greece -0.58 0.14 -0.43 -0.32 -0.12
Hungary 0.47 1.22 1.69 1.49 0.21
Latvia 6.03 -0.58 5.44 4.95 0.49
Lithuania 5.21 -0.55 4.65 4.19 0.46
Poland 1.02 0.99 2.01 1.86 0.16
Portugal 0.07 0.05 0.13 0.31 -0.19
Romania 2.37 -0.23 2.13 1.96 0.17
Slovakia 2.76 -0.49 2.26 1.88 0.38
Slovenia 1.24 -0.34 0.90 0.62 0.28
Spain 0.30 0.17 0.47 0.75 -0.29
Sweden 0.81 0.04 0.84 0.86 -0.02
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Are Economic Integration Agreements Important
in Determining FDI Flows?
2.1 Introduction
Accompanying the growth of trade, globalization has also witnessed to a large
increases in the amount of foreign direct invesment (FDI) flows and in the number
of economic integration agreements (EIAs) since 1990s17. Over this time period, the
global FDI flows increased by about 816%, EIAs went up by nearly 950% and the
world GDP rose by 220%18. Along with the statistical indicators, several previous
studies using gravity model show that bilateral FDI is positively linked to the presence
of EIAs (Yeyati et al., 2003; MacDermott, 2007; Adam, 2013) as well as GDPs of pair
countries (Bevan and Estrin, 2004; Benassy-Quere et al., 2007; Berden et al., 2012;
Estrin and Uvalic, 2014).
The gravity equation is perhaps one of most widely used specifications to explain
the determinant factors of bilateral FDI flows among countries (Blonigen, 2005).
Typically, the dependent variable FDI from home country to host country is regressed
17EIAs typically refer to free trade agreements (FTAs), custom unions (CUs), common markets
(CMs), and economic unions (EUs); however, in the present paper, FTA and CU are combined due
to few observations.
18The data on FDI and GDP are obtained from the World Bank’s “World Development Indica-
tors”, http://data.worldbank.org, and the data on EIAs are taken from the World Trade Organiza-
tion database, http://www.wto.org/.
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on the GDPs of home and host countries, bilateral distance and a variety of variables
that proxy for investment costs or the absence of investment costs. These variables
typically include factors such as common language, common border and integration
agreements. Yet, an econometric issue in the estimaton process of typical gravity
model arises as a result of endogeneity bias problem since the presence of EIAs (in a
gravity equation) is not exogenous (Trefler, 1993; Baier and Bergstrand, 2007; 2009)
because countries likely select into EIAs due to reasons correlated with the amount
of bilateral FDI, but not easily captured by the econometrician.
A seminal work in international trade by Baier and Bergstrand (2007) not only
persuasively argued that neither a traditional nor a theoritically motivated gravity
specification would produce unbiased estimates of right-hand side variables in a cross-
section framework but also suggested that one could remove the EIAs endogeneity
problem and obtain unbiased coefficients on EIAs applying panel data into the grav-
ity equation using country-year and country-pair fixed effects. Anderson and Yotov
(2012) supported the use of the fixed effects with the panel data to obtain unbiased
estimates.
Although endogeneity bias of EIAs are extensively addressed in the international
trade literature, to the best of our knowledge, no study has ever used the gravity
equation with cross-section or panel data to address this econometric issue and aim
to individually estimate the effects of each type of EIAs (FTA, CM and EU) on
bilateral FDI flows employing home-year and host-year, and country-pair fixed effects
following Baier and Bergstrand (2007). Morever, the estimation results from the
previous literature are mixed at best (Yeyati et al., 2003; Di Giovanni, 2005; Jang,
2011; Paniagua, 2011; Adam, 2013)19. Thus, the objective of the current study is to
19These papers estimate the variables of interest using a gravity equation with only country-specific
fixed effect and/or time-dummies.
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fill the gap in the FDI literature.
Furthermore, the papers analyzing the determinants of bilateral FDI based on
the gravity model mostly have a relatively small sample or use one form of EIAs.
The present study contributes to the existing literature in two ways in addition to
addressing and attempting to resolve endogeneity bias caused by omitted variables
(and selection). We study with bilateral FDI data of 189 countries for ten years
(1999-2008) and estimate coefficients on EIAs for bilateral FDI flows as well as bi-
lateral distance and the dummy variables common language, adjacency and colonial
relationship on bilateral FDI flows accounting for the time-varying country specific
and country-pair specific fixed effects.
2.2 Estimation of the Gravity Model with Cross-Sectional Data
The gravity equation has been recently applied to FDI context even though it has
been widely used in international trade literature. Although theoritical models based
on principles of microeconomics have been implemented into the international trade
literature, the gravity equation on FDI has limited formal theoritical foundaditions.
Nevertheless, the recent empirical and theoritical applications of the gravity approach
to international trade, i.e. Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), can be adopted into
FDI literature because the same issue arises in this context and the employed gravity
approach for bilateral FDI is still a gravity-like model.
We first write the traditional gravity model to explain the bilateral FDI flows
employing cross-section data:
ln(FDIij) = α + αln(GDPi) + αln(GDPj) + αln(dij) + αlangij + αbordij
+α6colij + α7FTAij + α8CMij + α9EUij + εij (12)
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where FDIij is the total value of nominal foreign direct investment flows from investor
country i to host country j, GDPi and GDPj are the countries’ current values of gross
domestic products used as proxies for national incomes, the variable dij denotes the
bilateral distance between origin i to destionation j, the dummy variable langij is
equal to one when countries officially speak the same language and 0 otherwise, the
binary variable for the border effect, bordij, is equal to unity when countries are
adjacent and 0 otherwise, colij is a dummy variable assuming the value 1 when two
countries have ever shared a common colonizer and zero otherwise.
The binary variable free trade agreement, FTAij, is equal to 1 when countries
sign a free trade aggrement and 0 otherwise, CMij is a binary variable assuming
the value one if countries are in a common market and 0 otherwise, the dummy
variable EUij is equal to unity for countries which join to an economic union and zero
otherwise.
The traditional gravity equation for each single year from 1999 to 2008 is esti-
mated based on the ordinary least squares (OLS) approach. The cross-section esti-
mation results of eq. 12 are reported in table 2.2. GDPs of origin and destination
countries are found to have significant and positive effects on bilateral FDI. In ad-
dition, GDP of the origin has greater impact on FDI flows, which is in line with
that found by Bergstrand and Egger (2007) and Berden et al. (2012). The effect of
bilateral distance is negative and significant across years. As consistent with the inter-
national trade and FDI literatures, the dummy variables common language, common
border and colonial relationship are found to increase bilateral FDI.
Table 2.2 shows that the coefficients on EIAs, even for the same type of agree-
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ment, are prominently differrent in terms of their signs and magnitudes over years20.
In detail, the coefficients on FTA are very unstable, ranging from -0.41 to 0.37, and
statistically insignificant in some years. The estimates for the binary variables CM
and EU are more stable in the sense they are consistently positive but they show a
fair degree of variation.
2.2.1. Introducing Fixed Effects
As elaborated by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) and supported by Baier and
Bergstrand (2007) in international trade context, and Berden et al. (2012) in FDI
context, there is an econometric issue in estimating eq. 12 because of the omitted-
variable bias problem which arises due to omission of one or more important factors
makes the estimates biased and inconsistent (Wooldridge, 2009). Following Ander-
son and van Wincoop (2003) and Feenstra (2004), eq.12 can be re-written including
country-specific fixed effects to obtain unbiased estimation results. Hence, eq. 13 can
be defined as:
ln(FDIij/GDPi ∗GDPj) = α0 + αkTij + vi + uj + εij, k = 3, 4..., 9 (13)
where Tij stands for time-constant (distance, common border, common language and
colonial relationship) and time-varying (FTA, CM and EU) investment costs. The
home-and-host-specific fixed effects are denoted by vi and uj, in order.
We apply constrained OLS techniques to estimate the model in eq. 13 using
country-specific fixed effects to control for unobserved variables due to Anderson and
van Wincoop (2003) and Feenstra (2004). The cross-section outputs for each year from
20Pease note that although FTA can mostly remove the tariffs and quatos between member coun-
tries, CM and EU not only removes the trade barriers but also allows the free movement of capitals
(FDI), labors and services among members.
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1999-2008 of eq. 13 are represented in table 2.3. Relying on the suggestions of these
authors, the coefficients on EIAs should be more stable. However, the estimation
results for them are still unstable across time and in some years are interestingly
different in terms of signs. Thus, the estimates are said to biased as Baier and
Bergstrand (2007) argued that the use of country-specific fixed effects in a cross-
sectional framework would not completely solve the endogeneity bias if countries
selected into EIAs21.
A few studies have employed instrumental variables (IV) or control-function as
alternative methodologies to eliminate the possible endogeneity problem of EIAs in
a gravity equation with cross-sectional data22. These studies; however, failed to take
care of the EIA endogeneity bias caused by omitted variables while using a set of
economic and political IV or Heckman’s control-function methodology because it is
very hard to find an instrumental variable representing EIAs, but not correlated with
the error term and as Baier and Bergstrand (2007) explained that “ ... the vast num-
ber of variables that are correlated cross-sectionally with the probability of having an
FTA (EIAs) are also correlated cross-sectionally with trade (FDI) flows, preventing
elimination of the endogeneity bias using cross-section techniques”. Although previ-
ous papers and discussions imply that we are not able to solve endogeneity problem
of EIA dummy variables in a cross-sectional framework, we argue in section 3 that
one can deal with the problem applying a panel data to the gravity specification.
2.2.2 Endogeneity Bias
One of the well known issues in a cross-sectional framework is the possible en-
dogeneity of dependent variables. When an independent variable in either eq. 12 or
21Further information about the endogeneity bias is given in the later section.
22Please see Baier and Bergstrand (2002), Magee (2003), and Baier and Bergstrand (2007).
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eq. 13 is correlated with the error term, εij, fails to produce unbiased and consistent
estimates of αk (k=1,2,...9). Wooldridge (2009) categorized the possible sources of
endogeneity bias as “omitted variables”, “simultaneity” and “measurement error”.
Baier and Bergstrand (2007) claimed that “omitted variables” (and selection prob-
lem) among them was the most important factor in creating endogeneity bias23.
Focusing narrowly on the endogeneity problem of EIA binary variables, Lawrence
(1998) pointed that “The issue of exogeneity may also be an important problem when
dummy variables are used (in the gravity model) to estimate the effects of free trade
areas (EIAs). Free trade areas may well be an endogenous variable-that is, a response
to, rather than a source of, large trade flows.” In addition, Trefler (1993), and Lee
and Swagel (1997) demonstrated that existence or absence of EIAs was not exogenous
and estimation effects were underestimated due to endogeneity bias. A recent study
by Baier and Bergstrand (2007) showed that estimation results of EIAs suffered from
endogeneity bias, perhaps because of self selection of country pairs’ governments
into trade agreements and related to the amount of bilateral trade flows. They also
mentioned that the decisions of countries on joining EIAs were slow-moving; however,
trade (FDI) flows were not slow-moving. The presence of slow-moving problem implies
that observed variables in investment costs, Tij, are likely to be highly correlated with
unobservable variables concealed in the error term εij.
2.3 Estimation of the Gravity Model with Panel Data
Given potential endogeneity of EIAs when estimating time-varying investment
cost variables in the gravity equation with cross-sectional data, we apply the panel
data into the gravity model with fixed effects to address and resolve the problem.
Fixed effects versus random effects are preferred because we believe that there are
23Please see their paper for further information and discussion on the sources of endogeneity bias.
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unobservable time-constant country-pair variables –κij– impacting the existence of
EIAs as well as the volume of bilateral FDI flows. Relying on the presence of corre-
lation between κij and EIAs, fixed effects versus random effets are chosen since the
former enables random correlation between κij and EIAs; on the contrary, the latter
assumes no correlation between those variables.
2.3.1 Data
The data on bilateral foreign direct investment flows for 189 countries over the
period of 1999-2008 are kindly provided by Baier and Bergstrand24. The data for
GDP for each pair come from the World Bank’s “World Development Indicators”.
The data on investment cost variables are obtained from diffrent sources.
The variables distance and common colonizer are drawn from “Centre d’Etudes
Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales” (CEPII). We use the distance measure
associated with distance in kilometers between the most populous city in countries.
Papers mentioned in the introduction section indicated that the volume of bilateral
FDI are negatively correlated with bilateral distance. Intuitively, marginal costs (i.e.
transportation costs) and fixed costs (i.e. searching cost) rise as dij increases. A
colonial relationship refer to a historical tie between countries that can increase FDI
among them.
The variables common language and common border are obtained from Head
et al. (2010). Expected sign of speaking the same offical language is positive as
Helliwell (1997) noted “A common language provides evidence of common cultural
roots, shared literature and lore, and even shared codes of law.” In addition, a pair
of adjacent countries are expected to have cultural and economic similarities that
encourage FDI among them.
24A complete list of countries is provided in table 2.1.
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The data for EIAs from 1999-2005 are taken from Jeffrey Bergstrand’s website25
and from 2006-2008 are drawn from the WTO database. Because both CM and EU
provide free movement of capital, labor and other services, members likely have more
FDI flows. In constrast, FTA and CU may or may not have statistically significant
effects on FDI as they can only eliminate trade barriers among members.
2.3.2 Fixed Effects Estimation of the Gravity Model
In a panel framework, the traditional gravity equation can be written by:
ln(FDIijt) = α + αln(GDPit) + αln(GDPjt) + αln(dijt) + αlangijt
+α5bordijt + α6colijt + α7FTAijt + α8CMijt + α9EUijt + εijt (14)
We perform OLS techniques to estimate the model in eq. 14 using several meth-
ods with and without country-pair fixed effects and year fixed effects. Column (1)
in table 2.4 shows the estimation results for ten years of eq. 14 without using any
fixed-effect. GDPs of home-and-host country have economically significant and pos-
itive effects on bilateral FDI. The effect of bilateral distance on FDIij is significant
and negative. The dummy variables common language, common border and colonial
relationship have expected signs. As discussed in the data section, FTA is not statis-
tically significant in determining bilateral FDI. The coefficient estimates of CM and
EU are 0.66 and 1.08, implying that country i invest more in country j when they
sign an economic agreement allowing free movement of capital across countries.
The first modification is performed by including time (year) effects into eq. 14 to
25The data are available at www.nd.edu/jbergstr/ and constructed under National Science Foun-
dation grants SES-0351018 and SES-0351154, and used by many studies including Baier and
Bergstrand (2007), Baier et al. (2008) and Baier et al. (2014).
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control for unobserved independent variables that vary over years but stay unchanged
across countries. Ignoring year-fixed effects may result in an omitted variable bias
problem because some variations in FDI cannot be completely captured by the de-
pendent variables. Column (2) in table 2.4 provides the estimates of gravity equation
using year fixed effects. Even though the coefficient on FTA is still not statistically
significant, the average treatment effects of CM and EU on bilateral FDI sligtly go
up to 123% and 207%, respectively26.
The next modification is applied by including only country-pair (bilateral) fixed
effects to consider unobserved time-constant variables. Egger and Pfaffermayr (2003)
noted that country-pair fixed effects account for a considerable part of variations in the
dependent variable. Hence, inclusion of bilateral fixed effects presumably eliminates
some portion of the EIAs endogeneity. The estimation results of the gravity equation
with country-pair fixed effects are reported in column (3). Prominent changes are
that the coefficient estimate for FTA become significant, and the impacts of CM and
EU are less than the previous case.
Last, time dummies and bilateral fixed effects are simultaneously included into
eq. 14 to control for the above-mentioned time-invariant and time-varying unob-
served omitted variables together. Column (4) represents that the presence of FTA,
CM and CU result in 15%, 93% and 170% increases in bilateral FDI, respectively27.
It is obvious that bilateral fixed effects and time dummies account for a large number
of explanatory unobserved variables; nevertheless, they cannot capture very impor-
tant country-specific unobserved variables varying over time, namely the multilateral
resistance terms. Baier and Bergstrand (2007) also indicated that employing only




into EIAs. We should thus consider the time-varying country specific effects because
neglecting such terms can potentially yield an endogeneity due to omitted variables
(and selection).
Baier and Bergstrand (2007) suggested that one should remove endogeneity bias
of EIAs by applying panel data techniques into the gravity equation and employing
country-pair fixed effect, home-year and host-year fixed effects28. Following their
approach, we can express eq. 15 by scaling the dependent variable by the product of
GDPs as suggested by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) and including country-pair
fixed effect, and home-year and host-year fixed effects to attain unbiased estimates of
EIAs:
ln(FDIijt/GDPit ∗GDPjt) = α0 +α7FTAijt+α8CMijt+α9EUijt+κij+ξit+ζit+εijt
(15)
where κij is a country-pair fixed effect to capture possible time-invariant unobservable
variables impacting bilateral FDI. The parameters ξit and ζit represent home-year and
host-year fixed effects to account for time-variant GDPs of pair countries as well as
possible unobservable time-variant country specific variables for each pair of country
i and j impacting the amount of bilateral FDI.
We use constrained OLS to estimate the coeffcients on EIAs in eq. 15. The
output from the regression is reported in column (5) of table 2.429. As shown, the
coefficient for FTA becomes statistically insignificant; in addition, the CM and EU
coefficient estimates of 0.51 and 0.74 imply that they stimulates FDI by about 67%
28Yotov and Anderson (2012) among others supported the results of Baier and Bergstrand (2007)
using panel techniques.
29we report only variables of interest (FTA, CM, and EU) and do not report the estimates of the
home-year, host-year and country-pair fxed effects for brevity.
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and 110%, respectively. Our findings also indicate that the effects of these variables
larger the more integrated the economic relationship is. One can realize that the aver-
age treatment effects of CM and EU are now smaller after controlling for time-varying
country-year fixed effects and country-pair fixed effects. The estimation results of eq.
15 suggest that the previous studies using no-fixed effects or only year-fixed effects
or only country-pair fixed effects or year and bilateral fixed effects provided biased
coefficient estimates of EIAs. More imporantly, the FTA coefficient was considered
statistically significant althoguh it is not, and the CM and EU coefficients were over-
estimated.
2.4 Conclusion
The gravity model has been recently used to explain bilateral FDI flows. How-
ever, an econometric issue arises in the estimaton process of typical gravity model
as a result of endogeneity bias problem since the presence of EIAs is not exogenous.
Hence, the primary objective of this study is to use a tradiation gravity model with
cross-sectional data and then apply a panel data into a gravity equation with fixed
effects to address and eliminate potential endogeneity of FTAs, CMs and EUs. We
assert that the panel data approach produces unbiased and consistent coefficient es-
timates of FTA, CM and EU while the cross-sectional approach does not. What is
more to the point is that we find that the CM and EU coefficients are overestimated




Table 2.1: Country List
Afghanistan Dominica Laos Qatar
Albania Dominican Rep Latvia So Tom and Principe
Algeria Ecuador Lebanon Saint Kitts and Nevis
Angola Egypt Lesotho Saint Lucia
Antigua And Barbuda El Salvador Liberia Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
Argentina Equatorial Guinea Libya Samoa
Aruba Eritrea Lithuania San Marino
Armenia Estonia Luxembourg Saudi Arabia
Australia Ethiopia Macao, China Senegal
Austria Faeroe Islands Macedonia, Fyr Seychelles
Azerbaijan Fiji Madagascar Singapore
Bahamas Finland Malawi Slovak Republic
Bahrain France Malaysia Slovenia
Bangladesh Gabon Maldives Somalia
Barbados Gambia Mali Solomon Islands
Belarus Georgia Malta South Africa
Belgium Germany Marshall Islands, Rep Spain
Belize Ghana Mauritania Sri Lanka
Benin Greece Mauritius Sudan
Bermuda Grenada Mexico Suriname
Bhutan Greenland Micronesia, Fed.Sts. Swaziland
Bolivia Guatemala Moldova Sweden
Bosnia and Herzegovina Guinea Mongolia Switzerland
Botswana Guinea-Bissau Morocco Syria
Brazil Guyana Mozambique Taiwan
Brunei Darussalam Haiti Myanmar Tajikistan
Bulgaria Honduras Namibia Tanzania
Burkina Faso Hong Kong Nepal Thailand
Burundi Hungary Netherland Togo
Cambodia Iceland New Caledonia Tonga
Cameroon India New Zealand Trinidad (Trinidad And Tobago)
Canada Indonesia Nicaragua Tunisia
Cape Verde Iran Niger Turkey
Cayman Islands Iraq Nigeria Turkmenistan
Central African Republic Ireland Norway Uganda
Chad Israel Oman UK
Chile Italy Pakistan Ukraine
China Ivory Coast Panama United Arab Emirates
Colombia Jamaica Papua New Guinea Uruguay
Comoros Japan Paraguay USA
Congo, DR Jordan Peru Uzbekistan
Costa Rica Kazakhstan Philippine Vanuatu
Croatia Kenya Poland Venezuela
Cuba Kiribati Portugal Vietnam
Cyprus Korea Romania Yemen
Czech Republic Kuwait Russia Zambia
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Estimation of Gravity Equation with Approxima-
tion Errors
3.1 Introduction
The gravity equation is perhaps one of the most frequently used models to ex-
plain the determinants of bilateral trade flows. In a traditional gravity model, the
dependent variable bilateral trade flows from origin to destination is regressed on
the GDPs of exporter and importer countries, bilateral distance and a variety of bi-
nary variables that proxy for trade costs or the absence of trade costs. However,
the traditional gravity equation does not account for the effects of third-country on
international trade between pairs. It consequently produces biased and inconsistent
estimates. The seminal work by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) (Hereafter, A-
vW) developed multilateral resistance terms (or prices) to control the interactions of
pairs with the rest of the world (or third-country effects). Although the theoritical
gravity equation with multilateral resistance terms provides unbiased estimates, it
has not been widely adopted as it requires a non-linear estimation procedure.
Building also on the theoritical model of A-vW, Baier and Bergstrand (2009)
(Hereafter, BB) use a log-linear Taylor-series expansion (TSE) to linearize the mul-
tilateral resistance terms so that the model can be estimated using ordinary least
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squares (OLS) method. These approximations not only allow for “Bonus Vetus”
OLS, but also provide unbiased and consistent estimates since they are formally
equal to multilateral resistance terms. Yet, the analysis of BB was mainly on a
simple first-order TSE in which higher-order terms (approximation errors) were elim-
inated. However, elimination of these terms causes inefficient estimates of trade cost
variables (Wooldridge, 2009). Furthermore, unobserved heterogeneity still remains in
trade flows among countries as a result of not controlling for approximation errors
(random effects). Thus, the primary objective of this study is to estimate the theory-
based gravity equation using BB’s motivation in mixed effects model while accounting
for higher-order terms. In short, the coefficient estimates of models based on A-vW
and BB are unbiased and consistent, but only those of mixed effects model are efficient
due to the introduction of random effects and unobserved country heterogeneity.
3.2 Background
3.2.1 Theory
The empirical-based gravity model can be derived from several theoritical models
(c.f. Anderson, 1979; Baier and Bergstrand, 2001; Eaton and Kortum, 2002; Helpman
et al., 2008). Perhaps one of the most implemented models is the model of A-vW. In
their model, individuals in country j have constant elasticity of substitution (CES)
preferences and can purchase up to N varieties of goods from N exporter countries.
Considering firms within a country, the marginal cost of production is constant but
there is a fixed entry cost. In addition, production takes place under the conditions of
monopolistic competition and increasing return to scale technology. Because all firms
within country i have access to identical technology, prices of each differenciated goods
exported from i to j are equal to pij(z) = pij = pi∗Tij, where pi denotes domestic prices
of varieties, and Tij represents trade costs (i.e. transportation, insurance, tariff) that
58
firms in origin i face exporting the goods to destination j. In conjunction with these
assumptions, market-clearing conditions and several algebraic calculations compose










where Xij is the volume of bilateral trade flows from i to j, Yi and Yj are incomes
of exporter and importer countries, and Yw are world income that is constant across
countries and thus buried into the constant parameter along the further analyses. The
parameter σ is the elasticity of substitution between varieties of goods. The variables
accounting for the importance of third-country prices are outward and inward multi-



















where θi(θj) stands for country i’s (country j’s) share of world income. Note that
because true values of trade costs between countries are unobservable, as is common
to the international trade literature we approximate them by:
Tij = DIST
α
ij exp(αLANGij + αADJij + αCOLij)
where the variable distij denotes the bilateral distance between origin i to destination
j, the dummy variable langij is equal to one when countries share the offical language
and 0 otherwise, the binary variable adjij is equal to unity when countries are adjacent
and 0 otherwise, colij is a dummy variable assuming the value 1 when two countries
have ever shared a common colonizer and zero otherwise. In the framework of A-
vW, the dependent variable based on a theory is formulated as bilateral trade flows
divided by the product of exporter and importer incomes. Thus, we also impose
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unitary income elasticities to be consistent with their econometric model. Then, the
gravity model in equation 16 can be written in log-level form for the sake of empirical
analysis:
ln(Xij/Yi ∗ Yj) = ln(Zij) = β + βlnDISTij + βLANGij + βADJij
+β4COLij + (σ − 1)lnΠi + (σ − 1)lnPj + εij (17)
where βi = αi(1− σ), (i=1,...,4). A-vW estimated equation 17 using customized
nonlinear least squares (CNLS), minimazing the sum of squared errors. In the sub-
sequent sections, we discuss several distinguished approaches. They are by definition
analogous to equation 17 in terms of unbiasedness and consistency.
3.2.2 Fixed-Effects Approach
Despite the fact that CNLS can produce unbiased and consistent estimates of
equation 17, the non-linear approach has not been widely adapted. Nevertheless, A-
vW and Feenstra (2004) proposed to replace multilateral resistance terms for country-
specific fixed effects as an alternative specification that can be estimated by ordinary
least squares (OLS) techniques. This method not ony takes relatively less time but
also produce unbiased and consistent coefficient estimates of βi as well. Fixed effects
version of equation 17 is defined as:
ln(Zij) = β0 + (1− σ)lnTij + vi + uj + εij (18)
where the parameters vi and uj represent exporter and importer fixed effects, respec-
tively, and εij is a normally distributed error term. Note that although both CNLS
and fixed effects approaches reveal unbiased and consistent coefficient estimates as
both account for prices, it does not necessarily mean that the coefficients on trade
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costs would be identical. This matter is further discussed in the estimation results
section. Both of these empirical formulations only reveal the average treatment effect
and the general equilibrium effects can not be easily obtained.
3.2.3 Bonus Vetus OLS
Building also on the theoritical model of A-vW, Baier and Bergstrand (2009)
(Hereafter, BB) use a log-linear Taylor-series expansion (TSE) to linearize the mul-
tilateral resistance terms so that the model can be estimated using OLS. These ap-
proximations not only allow for “Bonus Vetus” OLS, but also provide unbiased and
consistent estimates since they are formally equal to multilateral resistance terms. In
addition, conditional general equilibrium effects can be obtained. To understand the
implication of TSE on mixed effects model, following BB the multilateral resistance
terms in equation 17 can be expressed as:
(σ − )lnΠi = βi(T̄i − T̄ ) + δi















, and δk (k=i,j) are the ap-
proximation errors capturing higher-order terms (or random effects). As is consistent
with random effects model in Wooldridge (2009), we assume that δk is not correlated
with explanatory trade cost variables, cf. equations 23-24. In addition, under strict
exogeneity on independent variables we also assume that random effects δk is partially
correlated with the multilateral resistance terms that may be constant distortions or
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A relevant question is “In what aspects does this study differ from BB?” The
analysis of BB was mainly on a simple first-order TSE with the assumptions of
19-20 in which higher-order terms were not explicitly included and instead elimi-
nated as BB noted “... a simple fixed-point iteration procedure that eliminates the
approximation errors without using a higher-order Taylor expansion which, as for
modern dynamic macroeconomic models, is very difficult and outside the paper’s
scope”. However, elimination of δk causes inefficient estimates of trade cost variables,
cf. Wooldridge (2009). Furthermore, unobserved heterogeneity, εij, remains in trade
flows among countries as a result of not controlling for approximation errors. Thus,
the primary objective of this study is to estimate the theory-based gravity equation
by mixed effects model while accounting for higher-order terms30.
After identifying that equations 21-22 have the same form as the correlated
random effects, we can thus substitute them into equation 17 to obtain:
ln(Zij) = ξ + βlnDISTij + βLANGij + βADJij + βCOLij + φiT̄i + φjT̄j
+δi + δj + ηij (25)
30For this purpose, the STATA xtmixed code can be commanded in equation 25 assuming that
the intercepts for the source and destination countries are random.
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The above equation now resembles a two-way correlated random effects (or mixed
effects) model. Because an intercept is explicitly shown in the above model, we assume
that the random effects are normally distributed with a zero mean as in Wooldridge
(2009). As mentioned earlier in this section, the econometric model in equation 25 is
similar to that in BB except omitting the parameters δi and δj
31.
3.3 Data
A cross-sectional data of 189 countries for 2005 is employed within this study32.
The data on GDPs as proxy for incomes are drawn from the World Bank’s “World
Development Indicators”33. The data on bilateral trade flows for each pair come from
UNCTAD. The data on trade cost variables are taken from diffrent sources.
The variables distance and common colonizer are drawn from “Centre d’Etudes
Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales” (CEPII). We use the distance measure
associated with distance in kilometers between the most populous city in countries. A
number of studies have shown that the amount of trade flows are negatively correlated
with bilateral distance. Intuitively, marginal costs (i.e. transportation costs) and
fixed costs (i.e. searching cost) rise as dij increases. A colonial relationship refer to a
historical tie between countries that can increase international trade among them.
The variables common language and common border are obtained from Head
et al. (2010). Expected sign of speaking the same offical language is positive as
Helliwell (1997) noted “A common language provides evidence of common cultural
roots, shared literature and lore, and even shared codes of law.” In addition, a pair
of adjacent countries are expected to have cultural and economic similarities that
31The other difference related to equation 25 is that we approximate trade costs by DIST, LANG,
ADJ and COL whereas BB defined trade costs by only DIST and ADJ just as in A-vW.
32A complete list of countries is posted in table 3.1.
33The data are available at http://data.worldbank.org
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encourage international trade between countries.
3.4 Estimation Results and Conclusion
Starting with the fixed effects specification, we apply constrained OLS approach
to estimate the model in equation 18 using country-specific fixed effects to control for
the multilateral resistance (prices) terms. The coefficients estimates and estimated
average treatment effects (ATEs) for trade cost variables are reported in column (1)
of table 3.234. Considering BB’s first-order Taylor expansion, we also employ OLS to
estimate the econometric model in equation 25 excluding random effects δk. Estimates
of the effects of trade cost variables are presented in column (2) of table 3.2. Then,
we estimate equation 25 including approximation errors capturing higher-order terms
by using mixed effects approach. The estimates of βi and estimated ATEs for trade
cost parameters are posted in column (3) of table 3.2.
In advance to reporting estimation results of the models in this paper, it is
critical to elaborate the findings of previous studies related to this study. BB showed
by taking a first-order Taylor expansion and using “true” trade flows in a Monte
Carlo simulation that the coefficient estimates of distance and common border are
nearly identical to fixed effects and CNLS estimates in A-vW and Feenstra (2004)35.
However, it is noteworthy that by using “observable” trade flows of US-Canada for
1993 instead, BB indicated that the border effect was somewhat different than that
estimated using CNLS and fixed effects methods. Based on the same US-Canada
data, Feenstra (2004) also compared the border effect obtained using fixed effects to
that found by A-vW applying CNLS. The author reported that the ATE for common
border in fixed effects model was 4.7 and quite close to average effect of 5.2 explored
34Coefficient estimates of fixed effects are not reported for the sake of brevity.
35The authors generated true values of bilateral trade flows and multilateral resistance terms given
GDPs, bilateral distances and binary variables.
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by A-vW accounting for endogenous multilateral resistance terms. We close the
review by noting that the estimates of distance and common border in fixed effects
model, BB and A-vW are all consistent since they control for prices. As dinstict from
these studies, mixed effects model produces not only consistent but also accounts for
approximation errors. Assuming these errors are normally distributed lead to more
efficient estimation of equation 10 because it simultaneously accounts for prices and
unobservable country heterogeneity.
Returning back to analyses in this paper, column (1) reports that the coefficients
on distance, common language, common border and common colonizer are -1.62, 0.82,
0.87 and 1.00, respectively, and statistically significant at 1% level. The ATEs for
LANG, ADJ and COL are 2.27, 2.38 and 2.71, in order. Rather than those in fixed
effects equation, column (2) based on BB posts that the ATEs for LANG, ADJ and
COL are 2.01, 2.36 and 2.51. Note that the DIST coefficients of both models are
identical and the ATEs for binary variables of both models are close to each other as
expected. The estimates of βi(i=1,...,4) of equation 25 are -1.64, 0.75, 0.79 and 0.95,
respectively, referring to column (3). Although, the ATEs for trade cost variables
are slightly different than those in fixed effects and BB, they are once again quite
close to each other in the way we anticipated. We end this section by noting that
the coefficient estimates in columns (1)-(3) are unbiased and consistent; however,
only those in column (3) are efficient due to the introduction of random effects and
unobserved heterogeneity between countries.
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Tables
Table 3.1: Country List
Afghanistan Dominica Laos Qatar
Albania Dominican Rep Latvia So Tom and Principe
Algeria Ecuador Lebanon Saint Kitts and Nevis
Angola Egypt Lesotho Saint Lucia
Antigua And Barbuda El Salvador Liberia Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
Argentina Equatorial Guinea Libya Samoa
Aruba Eritrea Lithuania San Marino
Armenia Estonia Luxembourg Saudi Arabia
Australia Ethiopia Macao, China Senegal
Austria Faeroe Islands Macedonia, Fyr Seychelles
Azerbaijan Fiji Madagascar Singapore
Bahamas Finland Malawi Slovak Republic
Bahrain France Malaysia Slovenia
Bangladesh Gabon Maldives Somalia
Barbados Gambia Mali Solomon Islands
Belarus Georgia Malta South Africa
Belgium Germany Marshall Islands, Rep Spain
Belize Ghana Mauritania Sri Lanka
Benin Greece Mauritius Sudan
Bermuda Grenada Mexico Suriname
Bhutan Greenland Micronesia, Fed.Sts. Swaziland
Bolivia Guatemala Moldova Sweden
Bosnia and Herzegovina Guinea Mongolia Switzerland
Botswana Guinea-Bissau Morocco Syria
Brazil Guyana Mozambique Taiwan
Brunei Darussalam Haiti Myanmar Tajikistan
Bulgaria Honduras Namibia Tanzania
Burkina Faso Hong Kong Nepal Thailand
Burundi Hungary Netherland Togo
Cambodia Iceland New Caledonia Tonga
Cameroon India New Zealand Trinidad (Trinidad And Tobago)
Canada Indonesia Nicaragua Tunisia
Cape Verde Iran Niger Turkey
Cayman Islands Iraq Nigeria Turkmenistan
Central African Republic Ireland Norway Uganda
Chad Israel Oman UK
Chile Italy Pakistan Ukraine
China Ivory Coast Panama United Arab Emirates
Colombia Jamaica Papua New Guinea Uruguay
Comoros Japan Paraguay USA
Congo, DR Jordan Peru Uzbekistan
Costa Rica Kazakhstan Philippine Vanuatu
Croatia Kenya Poland Venezuela
Cuba Kiribati Portugal Vietnam
Cyprus Korea Romania Yemen
Czech Republic Kuwait Russia Zambia
Denmark Kyrgyzstan Rwanda Zimbabwe
Djibouti
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Table 3.2: Estimation Results
Fixed Effects (1) Bonus Vetus (2) Mixed Effects (3)
Indp. Var. Coeff. ATE Coeff. ATE Coeff. ATE
lnDIST -1.62 -1.62 -1.64
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
LANG 0.82 2.27 0.72 2.01 0.75 2.12
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
ADJ 0.87 2.38 0.86 2.36 0.79 2.20
(0.12) (0.14) (0.12)
COL 1.00 2.71 0.92 2.51 0.95 2.59
(0.07) (0.08) (0.07)
CONS -42.14 -16.63 -12.59
(1.08) (0.72) (1.03)
Note: Numbers in parentheses are std. errors of estimates.
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